THE CRISIS OF MULTILATERALISM: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, INSTITUTIONAL CONTESTATION, AND MINILATERAL FRAGMENTATION

Resumen

The contemporary international system experiences a profound multilateralism crisis, surpassing cyclical institutional dysfunctions and manifesting as a structural rupture in global governance. The central problem concerns how multilateral institutional erosion undermines international security by fragmenting collective defense, weakening conflict prevention, and destabilizing arms control frameworks. The general objective of this study consists of analyzing the systematic connections between multilateral institutional crisis and international security destabilization, examining both the structural sources of institutional contestation and their concrete manifestations in defense and strategic stability domains. Methodologically, the study adopts a qualitative approach tailored to examining complex phenomena involving multiple actors, contested norms, and institutional dynamics. The research serves both exploratory and analytical purposes: mapping relationships between institutional crisis and security outcomes where integrated frameworks remain scarce, while critically examining how structural properties of international institutions generate security consequences through identifiable causal pathways. Data collection involves systematic examination of multilateral declarations, United Nations Security Council resolutions, regional defense treaties, and policy documents from emerging power groupings. Analytical procedures combine content analysis of institutional documents with critical synthesis of scholarly literature on international order theory, security studies, and regime theory. Research findings indicate that multilateralism contestation stems from endogenous Liberal International Order failures: distributional inequities generating economic grievances, recognition deficits denying status to non-Western powers, and normative contradictions between proclaimed liberal principles and actual practices. The study concludes minilateral arrangement proliferation, while offering tactical flexibility to major powers, systematically exacerbates institutional incoherence and strategic unpredictability, disadvantaging less influential states and contributing to systemic instability rather than mitigating the security vacuum created by multilateral erosion. This research aims to contribute to ongoing debates regarding the future of multilateralism and the relationship between institutional architecture and strategic stability.