IS THE DUAL-CLASS UNIFICATION A GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICE? EVIDENCE FROM BRAZILIAN COMPANIES
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The study aims to analyze the influence of dual-class unification in the corporate governance practices adopted by Brazilian companies listed in Novo Mercado (NM). The study sought to understand if the adherence to NM and, consequently, the adoption of one-share-one-vote principle, impacts the Corporate Governance Index calculated with a Factor Analysis with the explicit executive benefits by the estimation of a Diff-in-Difff model, comparing treatment (companies listed in NM) and control companies (Traditional group) over the period 2009- 2016. Our main result shows that companies that joined NM between 2001-2013 did not have better corporate governance practices if compared to companies not listed in special B3 segments. This finding contradicts partially the theoretical evidence and puts in doubt the efficiency of being listed in different segments of B3. A possible explanation lies in the fact that, despite having all the requirements to adhere to differentiated segments of corporate governance, some companies do not do so, generating little difference in terms of governance for both groups.
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