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THE CRISIS OF MULTILATERALISM: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, INSTITUTIONAL CONTESTATION, AND MINILATERAL FRAGMENTATION

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Abstract

The contemporary international system experiences a profound multilateralism crisis, surpassing cyclical institutional dysfunctions and manifesting as a structural rupture in global governance. The central problem concerns how multilateral institutional erosion undermines international security by fragmenting collective defense, weakening conflict prevention, and destabilizing arms control frameworks. The general objective of this study consists of analyzing the systematic connections between multilateral institutional crisis and international security destabilization, examining both the structural sources of institutional contestation and their concrete manifestations in defense and strategic stability domains. Methodologically, the study adopts a qualitative approach tailored to examining complex phenomena involving multiple actors, contested norms, and institutional dynamics. The research serves both exploratory and analytical purposes: mapping relationships between institutional crisis and security outcomes where integrated frameworks remain scarce, while critically examining how structural properties of international institutions generate security consequences through identifiable causal pathways. Data collection involves systematic examination of multilateral declarations, United Nations Security Council resolutions, regional defense treaties, and policy documents from emerging power groupings. Analytical procedures combine content analysis of institutional documents with critical synthesis of scholarly literature on international order theory, security studies, and regime theory. Research findings indicate that multilateralism contestation stems from endogenous Liberal International Order failures: distributional inequities generating economic grievances, recognition deficits denying status to non-Western powers, and normative contradictions between proclaimed liberal principles and actual practices. The study concludes minilateral arrangement proliferation, while offering tactical flexibility to major powers, systematically exacerbates institutional incoherence and strategic unpredictability, disadvantaging less influential states and contributing to systemic instability rather than mitigating the security vacuum created by multilateral erosion. This research aims to contribute to ongoing debates regarding the future of multilateralism and the relationship between institutional architecture and strategic stability.

Keywords: Institutional Contestation; International Security; Liberal International Order; Minilateralism; Multilateralism.

Resumo

O sistema internacional contemporâneo experimenta uma profunda crise do multilateralismo que transcende disfunções institucionais cíclicas e se manifesta como ruptura estrutural na governança global. O problema central refere-se a como a erosão institucional multilateral compromete a segurança internacional ao fragmentar a defesa coletiva, enfraquecer a prevenção de conflitos e desestabilizar marcos de controle de armas. O objetivo geral deste estudo consiste em analisar as conexões sistemáticas entre a crise institucional multilateral e a desestabilização da segurança internacional, examinando tanto as fontes estruturais da contestação institucional quanto suas manifestações concretas nos domínios da defesa e da estabilidade estratégica. Metodologicamente, o estudo adota uma abordagem qualitativa adaptada ao exame de fenômenos complexos envolvendo múltiplos atores, normas contestadas e dinâmicas institucionais. A pesquisa serve a propósitos tanto exploratórios quanto analíticos: mapear relações entre crise institucional e resultados de segurança onde marcos integrados permanecem escassos, enquanto examina criticamente como propriedades estruturais das instituições internacionais geram consequências de segurança através de trajetórias causais identificáveis. A coleta de dados envolve exame sistemático de declarações multilaterais, resoluções do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas, tratados regionais de defesa e documentos políticos de agrupamentos de potências emergentes. Os procedimentos analíticos combinam análise de conteúdo de documentos institucionais com síntese crítica da literatura acadêmica sobre teoria da ordem internacional, estudos de segurança e teoria de regimes. Os resultados da pesquisa indicam que a contestação do multilateralismo deriva de falhas endógenas da Ordem Liberal Internacional: iniquidades distributivas gerando queixas econômicas, déficits de reconhecimento negando status a potências não-ocidentais e contradições normativas entre princípios liberais proclamados e práticas efetivas. O estudo conclui que a proliferação de arranjos minilaterais, embora ofereça flexibilidade tática às grandes potências, exacerba sistematicamente a incoerência institucional e a imprevisibilidade estratégica, prejudicando Estados menos influentes e contribuindo para a instabilidade sistêmica ao invés de mitigar o vácuo de segurança criado pela erosão multilateral. Esta pesquisa visa contribuir para debates em curso sobre o futuro do multilateralismo e a relação entre arquitetura institucional e estabilidade estratégica.

Palavras-chave: Contestação Institucional; Minilateralismo; Multilateralismo; Ordem Internacional Liberal; Segurança Internacional.

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INTRODUCTION

The international system confronts a crisis of unprecedented scope affecting the multilateral institutional architecture constructed after the Second World War. This crisis manifests not as temporary dysfunction but as fundamental questioning of the principles, norms, and mechanisms that have governed interstate cooperation for nearly eight decades. The erosion of multilateralism represents more than an administrative challenge for international organizations. It constitutes a structural rupture with direct implications for global security, affecting the capacity of states to prevent conflicts, manage crises, control armaments, and coordinate responses to transnational threats that transcend national borders. This phenomenon is situated within a broader context of rising global skepticism toward international norms and institutions, projecting an uncertain future for multilateralism.

The theme of this research centers on the relationship between multilateral institutional crisis and international security destabilization in the contemporary period. While academic literature has extensively documented challenges facing the Liberal International Order (LIO), analytical gaps persist regarding how institutional erosion specifically translates into concrete security vulnerabilities. Most existing analyses focus either on diagnosing the crisis of multilateral institutions or on examining specific security challenges in isolation, without systematically connecting institutional weaknesses to strategic outcomes. This study tries to address this gap by investigating the mechanisms through which the contestation and fragmentation of multilateralism directly undermine frameworks for collective security, conflict prevention, arms control, and peacekeeping operations.

The justification for this research rests on three fundamental pillars. First, understanding the linkages between institutional crisis and security destabilization possesses immediate practical relevance for policymakers and strategic analysts confronting unprecedented challenges to international stability. The paralysis of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the collapse of arms control treaties, the fragmentation of peacekeeping operations, and the proliferation of exclusive security arrangements all demonstrate that multilateral erosion generates tangible consequences for state security and global stability. Second, theoretical advancement requires integrated frameworks that connect international order theory, institutional analysis, and security studies, domains that frequently operate in isolation despite their obvious interdependence. Third, the crisis affects different categories of states asymmetrically, with peripheral and intermediate powers facing vulnerabilities as universal institutions weaken and selective coalitions proliferate. Analyzing these distributional consequences illuminates questions of justice and equity in international security governance.



The central problem guiding this investigation can be formulated through the following question: How does the contemporary crisis of multilateralism undermine international security, and what are the mechanisms through which institutional contestation and fragmentation translate into heightened strategic instability and increased conflict risk? This problem unfolds into subsidiary questions that structure the analytical progression. What are the historical and conceptual foundations of multilateralism as a mechanism for managing systemic security risks? What endogenous properties of the Liberal International Order generate contestation even among actors nominally committed to liberal principles? Through what specific pathways does institutional erosion affect conflict prevention, arms control, peacekeeping operations, and crisis management capacity? What are the strategic implications and systemic consequences of the proliferation of minilateral arrangements and ad hoc coalitions as alternatives to universal multilateral frameworks?

The general objective of this study consists of analyzing the systematic connections between multilateral institutional crisis and international security destabilization, examining both the structural sources of institutional contestation and their concrete manifestations in defense and strategic stability domains. This general objective unfolds into four specific objectives. First, to establish the conceptual and historical foundations of multilateralism as a mechanism for managing security risks in the international system, tracing institutional evolution from post-1945 construction through contemporary fragmentation. Second, to identify and analyze the endogenous sources of multilateral contestation, specifically distributional failures, recognition deficits, and normative contradictions within liberal institutions themselves. Third, to examine how institutional erosion impacts concrete security domains by weakening collective defense mechanisms, fragmenting conflict prevention frameworks, and destabilizing arms control regimes. Fourth, to evaluate the strategic implications of minilateralism and *ad hoc* coalitions as alternatives to universal multilateralism, assessing whether such arrangements mitigate or exacerbate systemic instability.

This work adopts a qualitative methodology tailored to examining complex phenomena characterized by multiple actors, contested norms, and institutional dynamics that defy quantitative measurement. The research serves both exploratory and analytical purposes, with the exploratory dimension mapping relationships and identifying mechanisms amid the relative scarcity of integrated frameworks linking institutional crisis to security outcomes, rather than testing predetermined hypotheses. The analytical dimension critically examines how structural properties of international institutions produce specific security consequences, disaggregating complex processes into constituent elements. Documentary and bibliographic procedures constitute the primary research means, combining content analysis of institutional documents with critical synthesis of scholarly literature.



The central argument advances through three interrelated propositions. First, contestation of multilateral institutions derives not primarily from external shocks or power transitions but from endogenous failures embedded within the Liberal International Order itself, particularly distributional inequities, recognition deficits, and normative contradictions that systematically generate grievances among diverse actors. Second, institutional erosion directly undermines international security by fragmenting collective defense mechanisms, weakening conflict prevention frameworks, destabilizing arms control regimes, and reducing the predictability necessary for strategic stability. Third, the proliferation of minilateral arrangements and ad hoc coalitions, while offering tactical advantages to major powers, systematically disadvantages less influential states and contributes to rather than mitigates systemic instability by exacerbating institutional incoherence and strategic unpredictability.

The analysis develops through four main sections following this introduction. The first section establishes the conceptual and theoretical-methodological framework. This section also examines both the foundational logic of multilateral cooperation and historical patterns of contestation the ongoing endogenous failures and legitimacy deficits within the Liberal International Order. The second section examines institutional erosion and security destabilization. This section provides evidence of linkages between institutional crisis and heightened strategic instability. The third section evaluates minilateralism and strategic fragmentation, assessing whether proliferation of selective coalitions and flexible arrangements mitigates or exacerbates security challenges created by multilateral erosion. The concluding section synthesizes findings, identifies theoretical and policy implications, acknowledges study limitations, and proposes directions for future research extending analysis presented here.

THEORETICAL-METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

This research integrates conceptual foundations of multilateral security with theoretical perspectives on institutional contestation and order transformation. This section first presents the methodological approach adopted to establish the historical and conceptual architecture of multilateralism as a mechanism for managing security risks in the international system. Subsequently, it examines the endogenous sources of institutional contestation, specifically distributional failures, recognition deficits, and normative contradictions that generate challenges to liberal multilateral order even among actors nominally committed to its principles. This integrated framework provides the analytical foundation for subsequent examination of how institutional erosion translates into concrete security destabilization.

A qualitative methodology guides this investigation of complex phenomena involving multiple actors, contested norms, and institutional dynamics that resist quantitative measurement. The study can



be characterized as exploratory and analytical in its research purposes (TAVARES *et al.*, 2025). Its exploratory dimension addresses the relative scarcity of integrated frameworks connecting institutional crisis directly to security outcomes, requiring investigation that maps relationships and identifies mechanisms rather than testing predetermined hypotheses. The analytical dimension involves critical examination of how structural properties of international institutions generate specific security consequences, decomposing complex processes into constituent elements to understand causal pathways. The research relies on documentary and bibliographic procedures as its primary means.

Data collection procedures followed criteria for source selection and temporal coverage. Primary documentary sources were selected based on relevance to research questions, institutional authority of issuing organizations, and temporal distribution covering the period from 1945 institutional foundations through 2025 contemporary developments. Collection focused on documents revealing institutional positions, strategic priorities, and normative frameworks articulated by diverse state actors including Western liberal democracies, rising non-Western powers, and Global South coalitions. Documentary analysis also encompasses sources including official declarations from multilateral forums, voting records and veto patterns within the United Nations Security Council, joint statements from emerging power groupings such as BRICS, regional defense treaties, and national security strategy documents.

Particular attention was directed toward scholarship examining institutional contestation, security regime dynamics, and the relationship between international order and strategic stability. This guided the theoretical foundations, establishing core concepts of multilateralism, regime theory, and liberal international order, supplemented by contemporary scholarship analyzing institutional contestation and normative challenges. Empirical studies providing evidence of security regime performance, peacekeeping effectiveness, arms control compliance, and crisis management outcomes inform assessment of how institutional erosion affects concrete security domains.

Geographic coverage spans global multilateral institutions, regional security organizations, and bilateral arrangements. Temporal coverage prioritizes contemporary developments since the 2008 financial crisis while incorporating historical analysis of Cold War multilateralism and immediate post-Cold War institutional expansion to establish comparative context. Synthesis of scholarly literature involves critical engagement with competing theoretical perspectives on institutional crisis, security governance, and order transformation, identifying convergence and persistent analytical disagreements. The analytical framework integrates security studies perspectives on threat evolution, regime theory regarding institutional foundations of cooperation, and recent scholarship on order contestation and institutional legitimacy.



The Architecture of Multilateral Security

The multilateral system established in the aftermath of the Second World War represented a deliberate attempt to institutionalize cooperation among sovereign states through shared principles, established norms, and formalized decision-making procedures (MARTIN, 1992). As articulated by Ruggie (1992), multilateralism constitutes an institutional form coordinating relations among states based on generalized principles of conduct rather than particularistic interests or ad hoc arrangements. The foundational logic of post-1945 multilateralism rested on several interrelated premises. First, collective security mechanisms could constrain the exercise of raw power by establishing legal frameworks and normative expectations that even dominant states would face reputational and material costs for violating (MARTIN, 1992). Second, institutionalized cooperation through permanent organizations like the United Nations would reduce transaction costs, increase information sharing, and facilitate repeated interactions that build trust and reciprocity among states with heterogeneous interests (RUGGIE, 1992). Third, multilateral forums would provide voice opportunities for smaller states, allowing them to exercise what Krasner (1985) terms meta-power by collectively shaping rules and norms from within established frameworks. Fourth, security regimes embodying shared principles would generate compliance not merely through coercion but through socialization processes and the legitimacy derived from inclusive participation (BUZAN; HANSEN, 2009; FONSECA JR; UZIEL, 2018).

This institutional architecture constitutes the so called Liberal International Order, explicitly designed to further economic cooperation, provide collective security, restrain unilateral uses of force by powerful states, and create frameworks for managing systemic risks in an anarchic international system (IKENBERRY, 2018). For intermediate and peripheral powers, strengthening multilateral institutions became a strategic imperative, as these frameworks offered superior alternatives to bilateral or unilateral arrangements for defending national security interests (LIMA, 2005). The institutional landscape of international cooperation extends beyond strictly multilateral arrangements to encompass diverse organizational forms that merit conceptual distinction.

Contemporary international governance operates through distinct institutional modalities that vary in membership scope and organizational design. Plurilateralism describes cooperative arrangements among a subset of states within broader multilateral frameworks, addressing specific issue areas where universal participation proves unfeasible or undesirable (IKENBERRY, 2018). The World Trade Organization (WTO) incorporates plurilateral agreements on government procurement and civil aircraft trade, allowing willing members to establish deeper commitments while maintaining connection to universal principles. Regionalism represents geographically bounded cooperation among states sharing



territorial proximity, often motivated by security interdependence, economic integration, or cultural affinity. Regional organizations such as the European Union (EU), African Union (AU), and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) combine elements of multilateral institutionalization with geographically limited membership, creating nested layers of governance operating simultaneously with global frameworks. Unilateralism denotes action by individual states without institutional authorization or cooperative coordination, reflecting either assertion of sovereign prerogatives or rejection of collective constraints on national decision-making. The distinction between these institutional forms matters significantly for understanding contemporary fragmentation, as the proliferation of overlapping arrangements creates what trade scholars term spaghetti bowl dynamics, where multiple institutions with different memberships, procedures, and substantive rules operate simultaneously within the same issue domain, generating coordination challenges and opportunities for strategic forum-shopping by states seeking favorable venues for pursuing particular interests.

At the conceptual core of the LIO rests a shared foundation of fundamental elements, notably the open trade regime, human rights, democratic governance, cooperation, and international institutions. This order was structured in the post-World War II era by the United States and its allies, aiming to foster open markets, multilateralism, cooperative security, alliance partnerships, and democratic solidarity, establishing a counterpoint to the Soviet-led bloc during the Cold War (IKENBERRY, 2018). Subsequently, following the collapse of Soviet communism, the liberal order experienced a global expansion, transcending its Euro-American roots and converting from an internal (bipolar) Cold War arrangement into an external, global order (BETTIZA *et al.* 2023). According to Ikenberry (2018), the “rule of law” dimension of the LIO is sustained by three central pillars: 1) the political, which emphasizes human rights and democracy; 2) the economic, driven by free-market capitalism and the neoliberal imaginary; and 3) the intergovernmental, guided by global institutions that manage state and human affairs under liberal principles, operationalized through multilateralism. In essence, the LIO comprises a “trinity” of liberal forces, encompassing institutions, economics, and politics, that aims to reshape states and societies, both within the West and beyond it (BETTIZA *et al.*, 2023). Economic interdependence, another crucial component of the order, is posited as a peace-promoting factor. Mechanisms such as democracy are held to foster democratic peace and interstate solidarity through cultural and institutional factors. The underlying premise is that a rules-based order enhances mutual understanding, cooperation, and integration (CHANDAM, 2022).

The order's claim to universality, as will be demonstrated later, does not apply homogeneously to all states in the international system across all dimensions. It is unequivocal that the LIO, like any order, lacks neutrality, embedding a set of interests that are “crystallized” (or “frozen”) in institutions and



practices. Consequently, it is imperative to consider the plurality of perspectives on the order, as analyses diverge according to theoretical frameworks and methodological approaches. The Realist tradition, for example, questions the continued viability of the liberal order in the face of an increasingly multipolar global environment. The premise is that, in such a system, heightened competition among great powers would erode the stability and cooperation foundational to the LIO (CHANDAM, 2022). In contrast, analyses stemming from Critical Theory dispute the very legitimacy of the order, exposing its underlying dynamics of hierarchy, racial bias, and imperialism (BADIE, 2018). Critics from this perspective maintain that the order does not constitute a mere value-neutral regulatory arrangement, but rather a vehicle with a dense ideological load. The LIO, therefore, reflects and promotes specific values and interests, often to the detriment of others.

Indeed, the LIO has always been simultaneously contested and structured by power politics, as an assessment through a realist lens makes evident. As victors of the bipolar conflict, the United States and its allies secured privileged positions within the order's central institutions (CONDE *et al.*, 2024). These institutions advance liberal-matrix principles, rules, and policies, favoring states that practice some form of liberalism or, at a minimum, do not challenge its foundations. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the LIO's legitimacy has been challenged on multiple fronts: from those who underscore its historical entanglement with imperialism and US foreign policy, to those who point to the insufficiency of its liberal credentials to address urgent contemporary problems, such as climate justice, rising inequality, and racial injustice (LAWSON; ZARAKOL 2023, p. 210).

The Cold War period demonstrated both the potential and limitations of this multilateral architecture. While ideological polarization between the United States and Soviet Union frequently paralyzed the Security Council, preventing effective collective security responses to numerous regional conflicts, the existence of institutional channels nonetheless provided mechanisms for crisis management and confidence Building (BADIE, 2018). The Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 emerged as alternative multilateral formations through which developing states articulated demands for greater representation and different normative frameworks, challenging Western-centric definitions of international order while remaining committed to multilateral rather than purely bilateral engagement (KUMAR, 2022). These contestations during the Cold War were fundamentally different from contemporary challenges, as they sought reform and greater inclusion within multilateral frameworks rather than rejection of multilateralism itself.

The immediate post-Cold War period witnessed renewed optimism about multilateral institutions and their potential to manage global security challenges. The apparent triumph of liberal democracy, the expansion of international human rights norms, and successful collective security operations such as the



Gulf War in 1991 suggested that multilateralism might finally fulfill its promise of constraining unilateral power and providing effective collective responses to aggression and humanitarian crises (MANN, 2023). However, this optimism proved premature. The 1990s also revealed persistent structural inequalities, as powerful states continued to act independently of international institutions when core interests were at stake. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in Kosovo in 1999, conducted without Security Council authorization despite the UN Charter framework, exemplified this pattern of bypassing multilateral constraints when deemed necessary by major powers (MANN, 2023).

The post-Cold War multilateral moment failed to address fundamental questions about representativeness, as institutions designed to reflect 1945 power distributions increasingly diverged from contemporary geopolitical realities (MILANI *et al.*, 2017). The early twenty-first century marked a decisive shift from optimism to what scholars now characterize as a legitimacy crisis of multilateralism. The September 11 attacks and subsequent War on Terror highlighted stark discrepancies in how multilateral institutions addressed human rights violations and uses of force, with Global North states enjoying impunity for actions that would have triggered condemnation if undertaken by Global South nations (CONDE, 2018). The 2003 invasion of Iraq, conducted by a United States-led coalition without Security Council authorization despite intense diplomatic efforts, demonstrated that major powers would bypass multilateral constraints when sufficiently motivated (TODOROV, 2012). The 2008 global financial crisis further exposed stagnation within advanced democracies and the disequilibria propagated by liberal economic rules embedded in multilateral institutions, generating widespread dissatisfaction with distributional outcomes (BROWN, 2020).

This historical evolution reveals that multilateralism's contemporary crisis is not simply the product of recent geopolitical shifts but rather the culmination of long-standing structural tensions and unfulfilled promises. The disconnect between multilateral institutions' formal egalitarianism and their practical hierarchies, between their universal aspirations and their Western-centric norms, and between their rhetorical commitments to justice and their actual distributional outcomes has generated cumulative grievances that now manifest as fundamental challenges to institutional legitimacy (LAWSON; ZARAKOL, 2023). Understanding these deep historical roots is relevant for analyzing how institutional erosion translates into concrete security vulnerabilities in the contemporary international system.

Endogenous Failures and Legitimacy Deficits

The contemporary crisis of multilateralism derives its intensity and structural significance from endogenous properties of the Liberal International Order that generate contestation even in the absence of



external shocks or power transitions. This crisis stems from endogenous failures embedded within itself, particularly distributional inequities, recognition deficits, and normative contradictions that have accumulated over decades. As Goddard *et al.* (2024) demonstrate, the LIO contains self-undermining features that systematically produce dissatisfaction among both external challengers and actors nominally committed to liberal principles. The distributional dimension of contestation centers on the LIO's structural inability to deliver equitable outcomes despite rhetorical commitments to fairness and mutual benefit. These structural weaknesses have generated legitimate grievances among both rising powers denied adequate voice and populations within liberal democracies experiencing economic insecurity, political marginalization, and security turmoil (TOOZE, 2021; 2022; PETRONE, 2024).

The neoliberal economic architecture embedded in multilateral institutions has generated profound inequalities both between states and within them, creating opposition from what scholars term the losers of hyperglobalization (BROWN, 2020). In the United States, for example, top income groups captured disproportionate shares of economic growth over recent decades while the bottom ninety percent of the population experienced stagnant real incomes, fueling populist backlash against the liberal order (ÖNIŞ; KUTLAY, 2020). Similar patterns emerged across Europe, where austerity policies following the Eurozone crisis exacerbated regional inequalities and widened gaps between political and economic elites and large segments of populations adversely affected by multiple crises. Developing nations have long contested these outcomes, arguing that liberal systems treat fundamentally unequal actors as if they were equals, thereby perpetuating rather than ameliorating structural disadvantages (LIMA, 2005).

These distributional failures translate directly into demands for institutional reform and alternative arrangements. When international organizations lack legitimacy, in part because they fail to reflect changes in the material power of their members, they provoke backlash (CONDE, 2022). The International Monetary Fund's voting structure, which historically granted Belgium as much influence as China, exemplifies how institutional rigidity generates grievances among rising powers whose economic significance far exceeds their formal representation (BADIE, 2018). Similarly, the permanent membership of the Security Council, frozen since 1945 despite dramatic shifts in global power distributions, denies recognition to major contemporary powers like India and Brazil while preserving privileged status for states whose relative capabilities have declined (ARAÚJO CASTRO, 1982). These structural hierarchies contradict multilateralism's democratic pretensions and validate accusations that the system serves particular interests rather than universal values.

The recognition dimension of contestation reflects the LIO's systematic failure to grant adequate status to dissatisfied actors, particularly those from the Global South. Recognition struggles involve more than material redistribution; they encompass demands for dignity, respect, and acknowledgment of agency



in shaping international norms and rules (ADLER-NISSEN; ZARAKOL, 2021). When states attempt to socialize into the liberal order by adopting its norms and practices, they often face what scholars characterize as stigmatization and relegation to inferior status, never fully accepted as equals despite compliance (ADLER-NISSEN, 2014). This humiliation generates resentment and provides fertile ground for leaders who frame rejection of multilateralism as recovery of national sovereignty and dignity (CONDE *et al.*, 2024). The demand for recognition manifests concretely in calls to reform multilateral institutions to reflect contemporary power distributions, revise voting weights in financial institutions, and expand Security Council membership to provide greater representation for non-Western regions.

The normative dimension of contestation exploits fundamental contradictions between liberal principles and institutional practices (BADIE, 2018). Liberalism is not a singular, coherent ideology but rather what Goddard *et al.* (2024) describe as a complex, historically contingent, and essentially contested concept composed of multiple streams that often clash. Different liberal traditions prioritize different values: economic liberalism emphasizes market freedom and limited state intervention, political liberalism focuses on democratic participation and civil liberties, while social liberalism advocates redistributive policies and collective welfare provision (ZÜRN; BÖRZEL, 2021). This internal pluralism means that actors can legitimately invoke alternative liberal values to contest existing institutional arrangements without rejecting liberalism entirely (GODDARD *et al.*, 2024).

However, as Goddard *et al.* (2024) analyze, the LIO is highly vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy largely aspirational principles necessarily conflict with concrete political practices required to create and sustain order in a world filled with illiberalism. When liberal states tolerate authoritarian allies, support coups against elected governments, or utilize torture and indefinite detention in counterterrorism operations, they undermine the credibility of the entire normative framework (TODOROV, 2012). These charges of hypocrisy gain salience when examining how liberal states have applied multilateral norms selectively. As Lawson and Zarakol (2023) analyze in their framework of the “hypocrisy charge”, the principle of humanitarian intervention has been invoked to justify military action in some cases while ignored in others, with patterns suggesting that material interests rather than principled commitments drive decisions.

Arms control regimes demand sacrifices from some states while permanent Security Council members retain massive nuclear arsenals and face no serious pressure to disarm. Trade rules enforced through dispute settlement mechanisms constrain developing nations while powerful states employ unilateral sanctions and tariffs that violate multilateral commitments with minimal consequences (LAWSON; ZARAKOL, 2023). This systematic inconsistency between proclaimed principles and actual



practices delegitimizes multilateral institutions even among actors who might otherwise support liberal norms.

When dissatisfied actors witness institutional gridlock preventing necessary reforms, their contestation radicalizes from what Goddard *et al.* (2024) term order-consistent demands for adjustment toward order-challenging calls for wholesale transformation or abandonment. The failure of reform efforts within the World Trade Organization, the inability to expand Security Council membership despite decades of debate, and the paralysis of climate negotiations all illustrate how institutional rigidity transforms moderate grievances into fundamental challenges (LESCH *et al.*, 2024). The institutional response to these grievances has often exacerbated rather than ameliorated contestation. As Goddard *et al.* (2024) and Lesch *et al.* (2024) demonstrate, strongly institutionalized liberal orders characterized by formalized procedures and high levels of legalization paradoxically prove most vulnerable to generating intensive order-challenging contestation. This occurs because institutional rigidity prevents the flexibility needed to accommodate diverse preferences as membership expands. Liberal strategies of inclusion, while normatively attractive, can lead to paralysis as achieving policy compromises among heterogeneous actors become increasingly difficult.

Internal decay within core liberal states constitutes another critical source of contestation. The rise of populist movements in both North America and Europe reflects deep dissatisfaction with economic outcomes, political representation, and cultural change among populations who perceive themselves as excluded from globalization's benefits (PETRONE, 2024). These movements frame multilateral institutions as threats to national sovereignty and democracy, accusing cosmopolitan elites of prioritizing international commitments over domestic welfare. The Trump administration's explicit rejection of multilateralism, the Brexit vote driven partly by opposition to supranational governance, and the emergence of illiberal regimes in Hungary and Poland all demonstrate that contestation now emanates from within the liberal core rather than only from external challengers (ZÜRN; BÖRZEL, 2021). When the hegemon itself challenges its own normative commitments, as occurred with U.S. contestation of torture prohibitions and withdrawal from arms control treaties, the entire order's stability comes into question (LESCH *et al.*, 2024; TANNENWALD, 2024).

This multidimensional contestation creates a legitimacy crisis that goes beyond previous periods of institutional strain. The current challenges are not merely about adjusting specific policies or expanding membership but rather about fundamental questions of whose interests multilateral institutions serve, whose voices receive recognition, and whether proclaimed principles possess any meaningful connection to actual practices. This legitimacy deficit directly impacts security cooperation, as states question whether



international commitments will be honored, whether institutions can provide protection, and whether collective action remains viable when the system's foundational principles appear compromised.

INSTITUTIONAL EROSION AND SECURITY DESTABILIZATION

The erosion of multilateral institutions translates directly into heightened insecurity through several interrelated mechanisms that weaken established frameworks for conflict prevention, arms control, peacekeeping, and crisis management. The paralysis of the United Nations Security Council exemplifies how institutional erosion eliminates mechanisms for managing great power competition and coordinating responses to aggression. The UNSC was designed as the primary forum for authorizing collective security actions and imposing binding obligations on member states (LUNDGREN; KLAMBERG, 2023). However, systematic use of vetoes by permanent members, particularly Russia and China blocking actions against allied regimes and the United States protecting Israeli actions from condemnation, has rendered the Council increasingly ineffective at fulfilling its core mandate.

The Syrian conflict demonstrated this paralysis with devastating consequences, as repeated Russian vetoes prevented even humanitarian interventions while violence killed hundreds of thousands of civilians. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine further revealed the UNSC's impotence, with Russia's veto power making any formal Council response impossible despite overwhelming international condemnation. This institutional paralysis forces states to pursue security through unilateral actions or selective coalitions rather than collective mechanisms, increasing unpredictability and reducing normative constraints on uses of force. Institutional dysfunction extends beyond the Security Council to encompass arms control and nonproliferation regimes, which face unprecedented challenges as institutional trust erodes, and major powers withdraw from established frameworks. The collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty following U.S. withdrawal in 2019 eliminated important constraints on missile deployments in Europe, while Russian suspension of participation in New START raises questions about the future of bilateral arms control between the world's largest nuclear powers (THE GUARDIAN, 2019). The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) confronts legitimacy challenges from non-nuclear states frustrated by the lack of disarmament progress among nuclear weapon states, with some analysts suggesting the regime faces existential crisis (TANNENWALD, 2024).

Peacekeeping operations illustrate how fragmented multilateralism reduces capacity for managing conflicts and protecting civilians. United Nations peacekeeping has faced chronic underfunding, withdrawal of capable troops by major powers, and mandates compromised by political disagreements that render missions ineffective (HANNUM; VALDAMIS, 2025). The AU-UN hybrid mission in Darfur



struggled for years with inadequate resources and political constraints that prevented robust civilian protection. When multilateral operations fail, regional organizations attempt to fill gaps through ad hoc arrangements often lacking resources, legitimacy, or coordination with broader international efforts. The G5 Sahel Joint Force exemplifies these challenges, as an understaffed and underfinanced regional coalition attempts counterterrorism operations without effective multilateral support, achieving limited results while violence continues to displace millions (PICHON; FARDEL, 2020).

The fragmentation of crisis response mechanisms demonstrates how multipolar competition can undermine integrated approaches to conflict management. The divergent approaches adopted by the United States, European Union, Russia, and China toward regional crises create space for state-sponsored spoilers who exploit divisions among major powers to pursue destabilizing agendas (DANDASHLY *et al.*, 2021). In Libya, competing external interventions by different coalitions supporting rival factions transformed a civil conflict into a proxy war sustained by fragmented international engagement. In Yemen, multilateral mechanisms proved incapable of restraining Saudi-led intervention or facilitating negotiated settlement, leaving humanitarian catastrophe unaddressed (ARDEMAGNI, 2020). When major powers prioritize narrow objectives over integrated approaches combining security, development, and governance dimensions, the effectiveness of international crisis response diminishes, and local actors face contradictory pressures from competing external patrons.

Climate security threats also reveal how institutional dysfunction prevents collective action on existential challenges that extend beyond traditional security concerns (VON LUCKE, 2020). Climate change represents a threat multiplier that exacerbates resource competition, generates mass displacement, and increases conflict risk, yet multilateral mechanisms have proven inadequate for coordinating effective responses (TAMANG, 2024). Despite overwhelming scientific consensus on both the scale of the threat and necessary mitigation actions, major powers lack the political will to subordinate short-term economic interests to long-term security imperatives. The failure of climate negotiations reflects deeper problems of collective action in a fragmented order where states prioritize relative gains and sovereignty concerns over shared responses to common threats (BOWDEN *et al.*, 2025). This inability to address non-traditional security challenges through multilateral cooperation suggests systemic failure with profound implications for future global stability.

The erosion of multilateralism generates a security environment characterized by what Öniş and Kutlay (2020) term the age of hybridity, where competing normative frameworks and institutional incoherence replace rules-based predictability with strategic uncertainty. In this environment, states increasingly view international politics through zero-sum lenses, investing in armament and military aggrandizement to ensure survival rather than relying on collective security guarantees. The absence of



shared objectives in multilateral forums means security cooperation reverts to defensive alliances and balancing behavior, traditional dynamics that multilateralism was designed to overcome. When institutional mechanisms that facilitated dialogue, confidence-building, and conflict prevention weaken, the baseline condition of international anarchy reasserts itself with attendant risks of miscalculation, escalation, and conflict.

Even liberal actors committed to preserving the LIO find themselves adopting more defensive security postures in response to institutional fragmentation. The European Union's shift from transformative approaches promoting liberal norms globally toward defensive resilience focused on protecting core interests exemplifies this adaptation (BARGUÉS; JOSEPH; JUNCOS, 2023). This defensive turn prioritizes strategic autonomy and selective engagement over universal values and comprehensive integration, marking a fundamental change in how traditional supporters of multilateralism approach security challenges. While tactically understandable given external threats and internal constraints, this shift toward sovereigntist logic and geopolitical competition may itself contribute to the LIO's decline by abandoning transformative ambitions in favor of narrow self-protection.

The proliferation of exclusive security arrangements further fragments the institutional landscape and creates coordination challenges. Initiatives like AUKUS, combining Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States in trilateral security cooperation including nuclear submarine technology transfers, operate outside universal frameworks and generate concerns among excluded states about being relegated to inferior security tiers (SHOEBRIDGE, 2025). While participants frame such arrangements as necessary responses to specific regional challenges, they contribute to perceptions of insider and outsider groups that undermine inclusive multilateralism. Similarly, the expansion of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) despite Russian objections, while defensible on security grounds for member states, contributed to threat perceptions that Russian leadership used to justify aggression, illustrating how fragmented security architectures can generate rather than mitigate conflict risks (MEARSHEIMER, 2022).

These direct linkages between institutional erosion and security destabilization demonstrate that the crisis of multilateralism is not an abstract governance challenge but a concrete factor driving increased conflict risk, arms competition, and strategic instability. The paralysis of the United Nations Security Council eliminates mechanisms for managing great power competition and authorizing collective responses to aggression. Arms control and nonproliferation regimes face existential challenges as major powers withdraw from treaties and verification mechanisms weaken. Peacekeeping operations struggle with inadequate resources and fragmented mandates that render them ineffective at protecting civilians or stabilizing conflict zones. Climate security threats intensify while multilateral mechanisms prove incapable of coordinating necessary responses, demonstrating systemic failure in addressing existential



challenges. When universally agreed frameworks weaken, particularistic arrangements can flourish, creating a more fragmented, competitive, and dangerous international environment where peripheral states face vulnerability.

MINILATERALISM AND STRATEGIC FRAGMENTATION

The proliferation of minilateral arrangements and *ad hoc* coalitions represents a strategic response to multilateral gridlock, offering flexibility and rapid decision-making unavailable in formal institutions (BADIE, 2014; CONDE, 2022). However, this shift toward selective cooperation generates systemic costs that outweigh tactical advantages, particularly for less powerful states. Minilateral institutions emerge primarily to overcome political resistance and institutional paralysis within larger, more formal international organizations. When established bodies prove incapable of adapting to changing power distributions or accommodating diverse preferences, dissatisfied actors pursue alternative forums that bypass procedural constraints and enable rapid, task-specific cooperation (REYKERS *et al.*, 2023).

The *ad hoc* coalitions can be established quickly to address urgent situations without lengthy negotiations, making them attractive for crisis response. Moreover, states pursuing maximal autonomy in foreign policy prefer flexible arrangements that avoid binding commitments and preserve decision-making independence. The BRICS grouping exemplifies this approach, functioning as multilateralism *à la carte*, where members selectively engage on issues of common interest while maintaining freedom to pursue divergent strategies on other matters (VAZQUEZ, 2021). The strategic logic of minilateralism involves institutional balancing in competitive environments. In regions like the Asia-Pacific, overlapping institutions created by different powers constitute what He (2019) terms contested multilateralism 2.0, where states use institutional creation and forum-shopping to compete for influence rather than cooperate for shared goals. China's establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) represent institutional balancing against U.S. dominated financial institutions like the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. Similarly, the expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization provides a Eurasia-focused security forum that excludes Western powers and promotes alternative norms around sovereignty and non-interference (SHENG; NASCIMENTO, 2021). These initiatives reflect not just cooperation for public goods provision but also competition over whose rules and standards will govern regional order.

For emerging powers despised and frustrated by exclusion from decision-making in established institutions, minilateralism offers voice opportunities unavailable in reformed forums (CONDE *et al.*, 2024). The expansion of BRICS to include additional members creates a Global South-oriented institution



that explicitly challenges Western dominance without adopting liberal principles regarding domestic governance or human rights. The New Development Bank provides development financing without the policy conditionalities imposed by International Monetary Fund and World Bank, making it attractive to states resisting external interference (CHIRKOV; KAZELKO, 2022). These alternative institutions gain appeal precisely because they are not dominated by Global North states and do not impose liberal norms that constrain domestic policy autonomy. This institutional pluralism reflects legitimate demands for greater representation and influence in global governance.

The proliferation of diverse institutional forms including minilateral coalitions, plurilateral agreements, and regional organizations generates what Romaniuk *et al.* (2024) characterize as competing layers of governance that simultaneously overlap and contradict one another. This institutional multiplication creates “spaghetti bowl” effects originally identified in trade governance but increasingly relevant to security cooperation. When multiple institutions and organizations address similar security challenges with different memberships and divergent procedures, states face incentives to engage in forum-shopping, selecting venues most likely to produce favorable outcomes rather than deferring to authoritative universal frameworks. The Asia-Pacific region exemplifies these dynamics particularly clearly, with overlapping security arrangements including bilateral U.S. alliances, ASEAN-centered institutions, Chinese-led initiatives like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and broader forums like the East Asia Summit creating a dense institutional landscape lacking clear hierarchy or coordination mechanisms. This fragmentation enables tactical flexibility but undermines the transparency, predictability, and universal participation that multilateral institutions were designed to provide. Regional organizations oscillate between complementing global frameworks and competing with them, sometimes serving as building blocks for broader cooperation while other times functioning as exclusive blocs that undermine universal principles. The resulting institutional architecture resembles neither the hierarchical order envisioned by post-1945 planners nor the flat anarchy assumed by realist theory, but rather what might be termed networked fragmentation, where multiple governance nodes operate simultaneously without effective coordination or shared normative foundations.

However, the systemic consequences of minilateral proliferation may undermine rather than enhance international security. First, flexible arrangements sacrifice the predictability and transparency that multilateral institutions provide. When cooperation occurs through informal leader-to-leader interactions at summit meetings rather than through formalized procedures with established rules, outcomes depend on personal relationships and power dynamics rather than legal frameworks and precedent. This informality advantages powerful states while disadvantaging smaller actors lacking direct access to decision-making circles. Second, minilateralism generates coordination challenges and potential



conflicts between overlapping institutions with divergent memberships and competing agendas. When multiple forums address similar issues with different participants and varying procedures, the result is institutional incoherence rather than effective governance.

Third, the shift toward minilateral defense structures increases rather than decreases systemic conflict risk. While such arrangements may provide tactical advantages for immediate crisis management among participating states, their proliferation contributes to rivalry, normative inconsistency, and uncertainty that collectively elevate insecurity (ÖNIŞ; KUTLAY, 2020). When security cooperation fragments into exclusive groupings, states outside those arrangements face incentives to form competing coalitions. Rather than reducing conflict risk through inclusive cooperation, minilateral proliferation encourages states to invest in material capabilities to ensure survival in a context where collective security guarantees appear unreliable. Fourth, minilateralism's flexibility can come at the cost of democratic accountability and civil society participation. When governance occurs through informal elite networks rather than institutionalized procedures, opportunities for transparency and public input diminish (FAUDE; KARLSRUD, 2025). The G20 and BRICS summits function primarily as venues for heads of state to negotiate privately, with civil society participation limited to symbolic consultation lacking meaningful influence on outcomes. This democratic deficit undermines the legitimacy that participation in decision-making processes could otherwise provide, reinforcing perceptions that global governance serves elite interests rather than broader publics (PETRONE, 2024).

The specific mechanisms through which states cooperate in minilateral contexts reveal both possibilities and limitations. Linsenmaier, Schmidt, and Spandler (2021) demonstrate that actors can negotiate security cooperation despite lacking shared normative understandings by employing mechanisms that cope with ambiguity rather than eliminating it. Temporary fixation of meaning, strategic exclusion of contentious issues, and emphasis on shared process rather than shared values enable pragmatic bargains among states with fundamentally different political systems and ideological commitments. This pragmatic cooperation may be the only viable approach in a post-hegemonic world characterized by normative pluralism (LINSENMAIER; SCHMIDT; SPANDLER, 2021). However, cooperation built on ambiguity and lowest-common-denominator agreements lacks the depth and resilience necessary for addressing complex security challenges requiring sustained commitment and mutual vulnerability.

The distributional consequences of minilateralism systematically disadvantage less powerful states. When major powers create exclusive forums for addressing security issues, peripheral states lose the voice opportunities that universal institutions provide (CONDE, 2022). The principle of sovereign equality that underpins multilateralism, however imperfectly realized in practice, establishes at least



formal rights of participation and influence (KRASNER, 1985). Minilateral arrangements abandon even this formal equality, explicitly creating tiers of states with different levels of access and influence (BADIE, 2014). For intermediate and developing nations that lack military capabilities to ensure security unilaterally or economic leverage to secure favorable bilateral arrangements, universal multilateral frameworks represent the optimal strategy for exercising influence. The erosion of these frameworks toward selective cooperation therefore reduces the international system's equity and increases the vulnerability of less powerful actors to great power competition and coercion.

The normative implications of minilateralism's rise extend beyond specific security outcomes to questions about what kind of international order is emerging. An order based on flexible, selective cooperation among shifting coalitions pursuing narrow interests differs fundamentally from one based on universal institutions embodying shared principles and collective commitments. The former accepts fragmentation and competition as permanent features, with coordination occurring only when powerful states find cooperation immediately advantageous. The latter aspires to move beyond zero-sum dynamics through institutionalized cooperation that creates shared interests in stability and mutual restraint. The shift from multilateralism toward minilateralism thus represents not merely tactical adjustment but rather a fundamental transformation in the organizing principles of international relations, with profound implications for security governance in coming decades.

Therefor the proliferation of minilateral arrangements and ad hoc coalitions, while offering tactical flexibility for crisis response among willing participants, exacerbates rather than mitigates systemic instability. Flexible cooperation sacrifices predictability, transparency, and inclusiveness that universal institutions provide, creating fragmented governance architectures marked by overlapping jurisdictions and competing norms. This institutional incoherence systematically disadvantages less powerful states while enabling major powers to pursue narrow interests through forum-shopping and selective engagement. The resulting order resembles what Öniş and Kutlay characterize as an age of hybridity, where normative contestation and institutional fragmentation replace rules-based predictability with strategic competition and elevated conflict risk.

CONCLUSION

This research examined the systematic connections between the contemporary crisis of multilateralism and international security destabilization, analyzing both structural sources of institutional contestation and concrete manifestations in defense and strategic stability domains. The principal findings can be hierarchically synthesized as follows. First, the contestation of multilateral institutions derives



primarily from endogenous failures embedded within the LIO itself rather than exclusively from external shocks or power transitions. Specifically, distributional inequities generated by neoliberal economic architecture create grievances among populations experiencing stagnant incomes and economic insecurity within advanced democracies, while simultaneously perpetuating structural disadvantages for developing nations denied equitable participation in decision-making. Recognition deficits systematically deny adequate status to rising non-Western powers despite their growing economic and strategic significance, relegating actors who attempt socialization into the liberal order to inferior positions that generate resentment and legitimize rejection of multilateral frameworks. Normative contradictions between proclaimed liberal principles and actual institutional practices undermine credibility of the entire normative framework, particularly when liberal states apply rules selectively, tolerate authoritarian allies, and bypass multilateral constraints when core interests conflict with collective commitments. These institutional weaknesses constitute self-undermining properties that generate contestation even among actors nominally committed to liberal values.

Second, institutional erosion translates directly into heightened security instability through multiple interrelated mechanisms. The paralysis of the United Nations Security Council eliminates authoritative frameworks for managing great power competition and coordinating collective responses to aggression, forcing states to pursue security through unilateral actions or selective coalitions that increase unpredictability and reduce normative constraints on uses of force. Arms control and nonproliferation regimes face existential challenges as major powers withdraw from established treaties, with collapse of agreements like the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty eliminating important constraints on missile deployments while suspension of verification mechanisms weakens confidence in remaining frameworks. Peacekeeping operations struggle with chronic underfunding, inadequate mandates compromised by political disagreements, and withdrawal of capable troops by major powers, rendering missions ineffective at protecting civilians or stabilizing conflict zones. Climate security threats intensify as existential challenges requiring coordinated international responses encounter multilateral mechanisms incapable of subordinating short-term national interests to long-term collective imperatives, demonstrating systemic failure in addressing non-traditional security domains. These concrete linkages demonstrate that multilateral crisis constitutes not abstract governance dysfunction but direct factor driving increased conflict risk and strategic instability.

Third, the proliferation of minilateral arrangements and *ad hoc* coalitions systematically exacerbates rather than mitigates insecurity created by multilateral erosion. While such flexible arrangements offer tactical advantages for rapid crisis response among willing participants, their multiplication generates institutional incoherence, coordination challenges, and strategic unpredictability



that collectively elevate systemic conflict risk. Minilateral structures sacrifice the transparency, predictability, and inclusive participation that universal institutions provide, creating governance through informal elite networks where outcomes depend on power dynamics rather than legal frameworks and established procedures. The distributional consequences disadvantage less powerful states by denying voice opportunities that universal frameworks guarantee even if imperfectly, explicitly creating tiers of states with differential access and influence. Regional organizations and plurilateral agreements generate spaghetti bowl effects where overlapping institutions with divergent memberships and competing procedures enable forum-shopping rather than authoritative coordination, undermining normative consistency necessary for predictable strategic environment. Rather than providing functional alternatives that preserve collective security benefits, minilateral proliferation reflects and reinforces fragmentation of international order into competing coalitions pursuing narrow interests, marking fundamental transformation from cooperation based on universal principles toward competition characterized by exclusive groupings and zero-sum dynamics.

This study confronted limitations that should be acknowledged. The qualitative methodology employed here, while appropriate for investigating complex institutional dynamics and normative contestation, limits capacity for establishing definitive causal claims or quantifying precise magnitudes of relationships between institutional variables and security outcomes. The temporal scope prioritizing post-Cold War developments, particularly dynamics since the 2008 financial crisis, provides a controlled historical depth for evaluating whether contemporary challenges represent unprecedented rupture or cyclical pattern consistent with previous periods of institutional strain. These limitations suggest directions for future research. Comparative historical investigation could examine whether institutional resilience mechanisms that enabled adaptation during previous crises remain viable under contemporary conditions of power diffusion and normative pluralism. Investigation of informal governance mechanisms and non-state security networks could reveal whether alternative coordination modalities compensate for weakening of formal multilateral frameworks or whether fragmentation extends across all governance levels.

The research findings carry implications for both theoretical understanding and practical policy responses to contemporary security challenges. The fate of the LIO has emerged as a focal point of vigorous scholarly discussion. One perspective contends that diminishing United States (US) hegemony, coupled with domestic democratic crises, antiglobalization sentiment, and withdrawal from multilateral commitments, indicates the order's approaching collapse. Conversely, opposing views maintain that the US preserves its dominant position in military and financial spheres. International relations scholarship must develop more sophisticated frameworks integrating institutional analysis, security studies, and



normative theory to capture complex dynamics where governance structures, strategic interactions, and ideational contestation operate simultaneously and interdependently. The necessity for effective security cooperation on existential challenges including nuclear proliferation, climate change, pandemic disease, and terrorism extends beyond ideological preferences, as these threats cannot be managed through unilateral action or exclusive coalitions. Yet political foundations for such cooperation appear fragile, requiring acknowledgment of legitimate grievances driving contestation, demonstration through reformed distributional outcomes that institutions serve collective rather than particular interests, and development of flexible procedures accommodating normative heterogeneity without abandoning core principles of peaceful dispute resolution and mutual restraint.

The contemporary crisis represents structural rupture rather than temporary dysfunction, but historical precedent demonstrates that international orders possess capacity for adaptation when actors recognize shared interests in stability and commit political resources to institutional reconstruction. Whether the international community possesses sufficient foresight and political will to undertake such reconstruction, or whether fragmentation will continue accelerating toward renewed great power competition and elevated conflict risk, remains the central question for global security governance in coming decades. The answer will determine not only the future of specific multilateral institutions but the fundamental character of international order and prospects for managing collectively the security challenges that transcend national borders and require cooperative rather than competitive responses.

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